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Markets for legal services are almost universally characterized by restrictions on market structures,
self regulation and perceived high economic rents. However, the unique relationship between the
judiciary, lawyers and the constitutional process, and the associated “political” power of the legal
profession, has protected lawyers from the type of modernisation that has occurred in most profes-
sional services - the moot question is whether this has been for good or ill? Although there is an
intensifying debatein most advanced countries centring on thesometimes archaicapparently selfpro-
tecting structures and the quality of legal services, governments have proved very wary of changing
the long-standing traditional structures that characterise the market. However, in response to a …nd-
ing that the current regulatory framework for legal services was “outdated, in‡exible, over-complex
and insu¢ciently accountable and transparent”1, the UK has decided to embark on a fundamental
restructuring of the regulation of legal services and ownership structures. This includes replacing
the traditional self regulation structure and allowing new ownership structures. These changes will
take the UK legal services market into uncharted territory (it will be unique in the ownership and
management structures that will be allowed).2 While welcomed by consumer groups, these changes
are extremely controversial and havemet with almost universal criticism by legal associations around
the world. For example, “both large and small member states condemned the proposals as posing
a grave threat to lawyers’ independence” at the 2005 plenary session of the Council of the Bar and
Law Societies of the EU.3
Since these controversial changes merely allow lawyers to do what they currently cannot, the
resistance presumably re‡ect a fear of their potential adverse equilibrium e¤ects. We believe, there-
fore, that it is essential to structure the debate within an equilibrium framework. Any governance
structure for transactions as complicated and elusive as legal services is multi-faceted. Explicit and
implicit contracts, reputations, relationships, networks (by which important information is transmit-
ted) all play a role in supporting the degree of e¢ciency achieved in legal services markets. To be
speci…c, since courts …nd it di¢cult to determine the quality of delivered services that may be in
dispute, these services are to a large extent, non-contractible.4 Furthermore, many clients (notably
private as opposed to large corporate ones), enter the market infrequently which makes it hard for
them to assess and react to quality of service.5 Such factors indicate that some clients may get
poor quality for money and this is certainly borne out by anecdotal evidence. For example, a recent
survey of dissatis…ed legal customers found that the primary concerns were costs (“we feel that we
were misled over costs from the very start”) and poor business service as much as poor advice.6
1Department of Constitutional A¤airs (2003).
2For example, the American Bar Association’s House of Delegates (the ABA’s decision making body) recently
ignored the recommendations of its own commission and rejected the introduction of new business models.
3Law Gazette (2005).
4The following recently supplied Evidence to the Joint Committee on Draft Legal Services Bill by ROCAS (Reform
of complaints against solicitors) makes the point “The position of solicitors in our society is unique in that solicitors are
the gateway to remedies available to the citizen who has su¤ered a legal wrong. . .. A client who brings a complaint
against a solicitor is severely disadvantaged. .. . Solicitors may have more legal knowledge . .. They are in a position
. .. to generate evidence, . .. . If a client has a medical or …nancial complaint, he can turn to a lawyer for help.
Unfortunately, as experience has shown time and time again, he cannot turn to another lawyer with any hope of getting
real help if he has a legal complaint.”
5See for instance Clementi (2004b) and O¢ce of Fair Trading (2001).
6Consumer Association (2004).
2In the long-run, poor service will be met with a low willingness to pay for that service, and one
can think of the potential bad equilibrium outcome between a lawyer acting opportunistically and
a client who does not have the ability to gain redress for the poor quality of the services provided,
as the “low quality-low price” benchmark that both clients and lawyers have an incentive to avoid.
This is a classic ‘governance’ problem of the kind discussed and surveyed in Dixit (2004). We take
the viewpoint therefore, that although the legal services industry supplies the foundations for the
formal-contractual governance on which many transactions are based, it itself operates to a signi…-
cant degree through the unwritten informal governance structures which have often been discussed
in historical or development contexts. Of course, these mainly informal governance structures are
typically referred to as ‘professional’ in this context but we believe it is appropriate to explore their
operation and reform through the tools which have been developed primarily for use in areas where
legal systems are weak.
The existing, status quo, solution to this governance problem is supplied by the legal professions
themselves who have developed mechanisms to educate and discipline their membership to improve
quality of servicedelivered and, consequently, therentsearned. A mechanism through which a strong
form of this professional self-regulation can occur is what Tirole (1998) calls delegated exclusion. In
the language of the profession, lawyers can be ‘struck o¤’. Alternatively, or in conjunction, private
clients may try where possible to use reputation from other purchasers and elsewhere as a guide.7
Tirole (1998) calls the refusal to purchase from suppliers with poor reputations direct exclusion, this
is one way in which market forces work. Roughly speaking therefore, one can view a shift from
delegated exclusion to direct exclusion as re‡ecting a shift from ‘professional’ governanceto ‘market’
governance. It is important to note that in both delegated and direct exclusion equilibria, lawyers
earn rents sinceit is the protection offuture rentsthat provides the incentive to supply good service.
In other forms of market based governance, speci…cally explicit contracting or relational contracting
of the kind discussed below, incentives can be provided to lawyers absent the provision of future
rents.
Webelievethat a simplebut useful segmentationofthemarket forlegal servicescan bemadeusing
two types of clients: infrequent-use clients such as most individuals and small …rms and frequent-use
clients, such as large corporate …rms. In contrast to infrequent-use clients, a frequent purchaser
typically has the advantage that he or she can have an ongoing relationship with a lawyer. This
enablessomeof the payment from client to lawyerto beconditional on speci…cactions (i.e., theclient
can pay a bonus), and (using a “bonus trigger strategy” such as that used in Baker, Gibbons and
Murphy (1994) and Dixit (2004)) theclient will not renege on this providing it isbene…cial to stay in
the relationship. The possibility of rewarding lawyers by means of relational bonuses equips frequent
clients with an additional tool for disciplining lawyers in what we might call relational contracts.
Note however that in contrast to the direct exclusion mechanism, such relational contracts do not
require lawyer rents in order to supply incentives. Of course, importantly, explicit formal contracts
also share this lack of rents property.
Central concerns in the policy debate over the regulation of legal services (and many other pro-
7A survey of factors determining choice of solicitor by private clients found that almost half of those surveyed either
said that the …rm had been recommended to them or they had chosen primarily on other grounds of reputation. Law
Society (2000).
3fessional services) have revolved around two types of regulation: (i) changes in regulation that may
raiseorset standards (identi…ed as part of theobjectivesfor regulation ofthelegal sectorin Clementi
(2004a)), and (ii) changes in the method of supply, notably along the lines of changing the legally
approved business models, an issue which has been particularly contentious in legal services. Under
(i) are the called for improved standards of transparency and accountability8. Few professional as-
sociations are likely to argue that they should not be accountable or transparent, but there is some
discussioncouched in thelanguageof“light touch” regulation. In contrast, many ofthelegal suppliers
argue that allowing non-lawyers to own legal …rms will lead to short-termism and too much reliance
on immediate pro…tability. For example, the Law Society (2004) claim that “there could be pres-
sures in owner-managed …rms to compromise …duciary standards in order to achieve a desired level of
pro…tability”. On the other hand, there is a view among many other parties that the exact opposite
would happen. For example, the Clementi Report (2004), when considering well-known commercial
companies, argues that “unlike most high street solicitors, companies such as these have nationally
known brand names to protect, which may be a powerful incentive to operate in a proper manner”.
That is, allowing well known commercial brand names to own companies that provide legal services
may introduce stronger reputational concerns for legal service providers. The perspective taken by
this paper is that such reputational forces are very much dependent on the levels of transparency
and accountability which are likely to accompany any liberalisation of business structures.
By and large, replacing or rather attempting to replace profession-based discipline (which we
model as supported by delegated exclusion) with market-based discipline (which we model as sup-
ported by a combination ofdirect exclusion and formal contracting) can erodeorenhancetheex-post
rents9 earned by lawyers, client welfare, and aggregate social surplus and quality of legal services
supplied. The paper documents a number of forces at work. There are Gresham’s law e¤ects, infor-
mational e¢ciency e¤ects, rent recapture e¤ects and relationship substitution e¤ects. These e¤ects,
moreover weigh di¤erently for di¤erent types of clients and impact di¤erently under various policy
regimes. The policy variables we discuss, which re‡ect the debate, are de-licensing, certi…cation,
transparency and accountability. We use de-licensing to describe a free-for-all situation in which
clients can no longer distinguish between ‘professional’ lawyers and others claiming to provide legal
services. Trivially, we identify a Gresham’s law e¤ect whereby just as bad money drives out good,
bad lawyers drive out good. Certi…cation however enables di¤erent types of supplier to distinguish
themselves. Transparency supplies more information to consumers about the quality of services pre-
viously and currently delivered but is non-contractible. Accountability is information which can be
used in contracts10.
Consider for instance a policy of transparency. If the information that clients are now able to
use to discipline lawyers is better calibrated to the clients preferences than the information that
lawyers themselves use, then a more e¢cient equilibrium can be supported by direct exclusion than
8See footnote 1.
9We do not model any ex-ante competition for these rents, presumably some of the rents are disbursed as subscrip-
tions to the professional associations which support the equilibrium. Benham (1980) for instance argues “One of the
most common ways of dissipating rents is by lengthening training programs. From the (profession’s) standpoint this
has the advantage that it can be legitimised on the grounds of raising quality. The longer and more specialised training
in turn increasies the professional character of graduates, who ... are more aware of the close relationship between their
own fortunes and those of the (profession).”
10Either private contracts or through a regulatory agency providing redress on behalf of clients.
4theonepreviously supported by delegated exclusion. In orderto inducetheextra e¤ort from lawyers,
greater futurerentsarenecessary. Both clientsandlawyers bene…t and obviously aggregatewelfare is
increased. Thisistheinformatione¢ciency e¤ect at work, themechanismisrelatively straightforward
so in the main discussion we calibrate the model to eliminate it in order to benchmark the other
forces. In contrast to transparency, increased accountability erodestheneed for futurelawyerrentsto
sustain performance and thereby sometimes enables clients to expropriate rents previously accruing
to lawyers in circumstances when the terms of the trade-o¤ are detrimental to aggregate surplus.
This is the rent recapture e¤ect. On the other hand, if accountability is su¢ciently improved, direct
contracting will lead to an e¢cient outcome. More detailed analysis and discussion is postponed
to the body of the paper. It is important to point out that, in our model, aggregate social surplus
as we measure it is one-to-one with the quality of legal services provided. We identify therefore
circumstances where the quality of legal services and client welfare do not go hand in hand.
Central to the paper is the interaction between reputational and relational sub-markets. The
importance of relational aspects in contracting was …rst highlighted by Macalay (1963) and Macneil
(1974). Early formal models of relational (or implicit) contracts include Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984)
and Bull (1987). Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (1994), Schmidt and Schnitzler (1995) and Dixit
(2004) study the interaction between relational and formal contracts in the presence of asymmetric
information, showingthat in di¤erent circumstances thesemay beeither complements, orsubstitutes.
The roleofreputations in inducing provision of higher quality ofgoods or services is studied in Klein
and Le-er (1981) and Greif (1993) and Tirole (1996) among others.
The layout of the paper is as follows. The next section provides an outline of the core problem,
the underlying model and a stylised status quo position supported by delegated exclusion. Section
3 addresses policy changes in two types of markets. We consider how de-licensing, certi…cation,
transparency, accountability and somecombinationsa¤ect theclient-optimal equilibria oftheinduced
repeated game. Section 4 brie‡y considershow thesee¤ectsinterrelatewhen thedi¤erent client types
operate in a single market. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model and Status Quo Solution.
We model the situation as a simple one-sided prisoners’ dilemma. If clients can’t obtain redress from
lawyers for poor service, then in the absence of some other form of governance mechanisms, lawyers
haveno incentive to incur costs in providing such services. Anticipating this, clients will be unwilling
to pay and lawyers and clients fail to realise gains from trade. We suppose that the current status
quo is one wherethis problem has been solved by legal professionals mutually disciplining each other
by a system of what Tirole (1996) has called delegated exclusion. In practice, delegated exclusion
does take place in legal services markets and is facilitated by a number of features. First, there is a
system of occupational licensing which allows precisely this form of exclusion11. Second, the bodies
which make such decisions arefunded in advanceby subscription so dynamic inconsistency issues are
reduced. Third, the ultimate responsibility for such decisions rests at a very elevated position in the
11For instance: The Roll of Solicitiors is governed by the Solicitors Act 1974, a person cannot be admitted as a
solicitor unless he or she has obtained a certi…cate from the Law Society. Once a certi…cate is obtained, an application
is made to the Master of the Rolls to be admitted as a solicitor. Solicitors can be removed from the roll, or struck o¤,
or have their practicing certi…cate suspended.
5hierarchy, i.e. with someone well practiced in taking tough decisions12.
For legal professionals, being struck o¤ is certainly one of the most severe penalties that the
profession can impose and therefore is the most e¤ective in enforcing good behaviour. Members of
the profession still have short term incentives to act opportunistically, but the loss of future earnings
if struck o¤ can counterbalancethe temptation ifthe lawyer issu¢ciently patient and the losses from
being struck o¤ are su¢ciently high. We model the idea of lawyers’ self-regulation by assuming that
all practicing lawyers must belong to a “Lawyers’ Association” (we have in mind of course the Bar
Council and the Law Society), that can freely observe through the natural network of their mutual
interactions the actions taken (which we simply model as a scalar e¤ort level13) by each lawyer in
every interaction with a client. Weassume that lawyers are in…nitely lived and have limited liability.
Each lawyer has a discount factor – 2 [0;1], and is matched with a client once per period.
Suppose that in order to maintain her membership to the association, each lawyer must exert a
level of e¤ort e a (at personal cost C(e a) =e a2=2) whenever the client o¤ers an up-front payment e s for
the service. If a client o¤ers anything else than e s, the lawyer’s e¤ort is not restricted. If a client
o¤ers e s and the lawyer puts in a level of e¤ort di¤erent from e a, the lawyer is automatically excluded
from the association.
We are looking for a self-regulatory professional equilibrium, where all lawyers exert e a (and all
clients pay e s). In order for such an equilibrium to emerge, three conditions must be satis…ed:
(I) Lawyer’s Participation Constraint (PC henceforth): each lawyer must be willing to provide
her services, rather than opting out of the market.
(II) Lawyer’s Incentive Compatibility constraint (IC henceforth): given the rules imposed by the
association, each lawyer must not be tempted to deviate (by putting in e¤ort level di¤erent from e a).
(III) Client’s PC: Given the equilibrium strategy followed by the lawyer, each client must …nd it
optimal to o¤er an up-front payment e s.
It is straightforward to see that the lawyer’s participation constraint – given by e s¡0:5e a2 ¸ 0 –
is always strictly satis…ed whenever her incentive compatibility constraint is. The lawyer’s incentive
compatibility constraint requires that 1





Client’s PC: each client’s payo¤ is e a ¡ e s. Notice that if a client decides not to o¤er a contract
specifying an up-front payment e s, his best option is that of o¤ering no up-front payment at all (as
the equilibrium does not restrict the lawyer’s actions when she is o¤ered anything otherthan e s). The
client’s PC constraint is therefore given by
e a ¸e s (2)
12For example the Master of the Rolls, is the third most senior judge of England, (subsequent to the Constitutional
Reform Act 2005) ranking after the Lord Chief Justice and the senior Law Lord (President of the Supreme Court).
Wikipedia lists the names of Masters of the Roll since 1286.
13This is for simplicity of exposition of the main points. In some respects it would be more natural to model actions as
multidimensional and to consider imperfect linear measures of actions similar to Dixit (2004, Ch.2). Such an extension,
would supply a more precise language with which to express the quality of information issues touched upon brie‡y in
the paper but our main results would not be altered.
6Putting together conditions (1) and (2), we see that the e¤ort levels that can be sustained in a
self-regulatory equilibrium must satisfy
2– ¸ e a (3)
Note that in the natureof models of the kind under discussion, thereare multiple equilibria. There is
always a bad equilibrium in which lawyersprovidepoorservice and are paid poorwages. Indeed, it is
theexistenceof the bad equilibrium whichsustain betteronesin a subgameperfect equilibrium ofthe
repeated game. Here, and throughout the paper, we concentrate on the equilibrium that maximizes






The equilibrium e¤ort level maximizes (4) subject to (3) and is therefore given by e a = –. At
equilibrium, each client’s utility is 0:5–, while the lawyer’s payo¤ per period is 0:5–(1 ¡–). Hence,
lawyers earn positive rents at equilibrium. This is all very familiar. The presence of rents for a long-
lived seller of legal services is necessary to ensurethat theopportunity cost ofdefection is su¢ciently
high to induce her to respect the implicit agreement undertaken with the buyer.15
For convenience we record this supposed status quo outcome as
Result 1 (Status Quo): When services are provided under a system of professional governance,
i.e. supported purely by delegated exclusion, clients receive a payo¤ of 0:5– and lawyers receive rents
of 0:5–(1¡–) per period.
3 Legal Services Reform
This highly stylized status quo gives us a baseline from which to consider the possible impact of
various changes to the regulatory regime. As discussed above, these are inspired by the Clementi
(2004) proposals and the subsequent draft legal services bill in the UK together with various similar
discussions currently occurring elsewhere.
First, however, we note that legal services come in disparate forms and there are important
heterogeneities between clients. At one extreme there are individual clients who only interact with
the legal system on a single occasion, or very few occasions, and who have poor information and
understanding on how the law works. At the other extreme, there are major corporations who take
few important decisions without …rst checking with their lawyers. Such corporate clients di¤er from
the individual ones both by the repeated nature of interaction and in that they are likely to be able
to better observe what it is that their own and other lawyers actually do. Initially, however, we
distinguish client type only by the frequency of interaction. It is a convenient unifying expository
device to treat all improvements in information as a policy change.
We turn therefore to policy interventions, which are analysed separately for both types of clients
denoted I for individual, and C for corporate. It should be noted that in what follows we consider
14We are primariliy interested in understanding how the status quo compares to various market based governance
reforms. From this point of view, the current assumpion casts the status quo in the most favourable light. We continue
with the assumption throughout because the governance reform we consider (Clementi (2004)) proposes to admit
competition between regulators, and this competition justi…es the assumption.
15See for instance Klein and Le-er (1981).
7a setting in which the two types of clients operate in entirely separate markets. Discussion of the
additional features introduced by allowing the two markets to interrelate is postponed to section
4. There are many examples of deregulation of speci…c legal services (e.g., notaries in Netherlands,
conveyancing services in the UK) but these are usually accompanied by some residual regulation.
The full open door de-licensing policy we consider below is unlikely to be proposed seriously or
implemented, but serves as a useful benchmark bad policy, which would fully justify the reservations
of the professional bodies. Discussion of this case also identi…es one of the forces, bad for social
welfare, which we aim to collect and classify. The point is, of course, that thee¤ectiveness of policies
depends crucially on the details. The details we shall be interested in revolve around how much and
what type of information is made available to market participants. As discussed in the introduction,
we distinguish between certi…cation, transparency and accountability and the paper is structured
to analyse the impact of various composite policies: entry of new types of legal service …rms plus
certi…cation, plus transparency, plus accountability and plus various combinations. Weareinterested
in analysing whichconstituencies(client, lawyers, and aggregatesocial surplus and thequality oflegal
services16) bene…t or are hurt by the various policies. Initially, we suppose that consumers have no
information whatsoever. They do not needit in the status quo becauselawyers providethediscipline,
but will need to have some information if market based regulation is to be e¤ective. In the following
we begin with de-licensing the profession under this scenario and then in stages consider the impact
of imposing certi…cation, transparency and accountability.
3.1 New Suppliers
Policy 0. De-licensing. (Newcomers indistinguishable from existing lawyers are per-
mitted). For both I and C clients, the“new” lawyershave, hereby by assumption, no mechanismto
prevent opportunistic behaviour. Because indistinguishable from traditional lawyers, newcomers can
make positive pro…ts from poor service without su¤ering from delegated exclusion. This will result
in clients paying for services that they often do not receive and the in the long run will imply that
the price that clients are willing to pay forlawyerservices will fall. This will also destroy the sustain-
ability of non-opportunisticbehaviour by ‘real’ lawyers since if the market is in a process of collapse,
the incentives to make short term gains predominate over the gains from retaining membership of a
moribund profession.
Policy I. Certi…cation. (Newcomers are permitted but are distinguishable from ex-
isting lawyers) In the client best equilibrium, there is no entry of lawyers who are not subject to
the professional discipline of delegated exclusion. The status quo is preserved by existing lawyers.
Result 2: De-licensing alone decreases client and lawyer welfare through the Gresham’s law
e¤ect. Certi…cation restores the status quo but there is no entry.
Policy 1 might be described as a debacle, while policy 0 is a disaster.
16Recall, in the model aggregate social surplus is increasing in a and can therefore also be read as a measure of the
quality of legal services supplied.
83.2 Policy II: Transparency
In practice transparency might involve establishing benchmarks, league tables etc., recording client
feedback. The feedback ratings on many internet marketplaces such as e-bay is a good example of
how such mechanisms can work in practice17. A lawyer acting opportunistically can therefore get a
bad feedback rating or drop down the rankings and will …nd it hard to get repeat clients. We model
the policy as rendering the lawyer’s actions as observable to clients as they are to other lawyers,
i.e. under the assumptions, perfectly. Recall, this information is currently assumed to be entirely
non-contractible, something that will be relaxed separately in section 3.3.
I clients: Given the equal availability of information, an equilibrium exists in which essentially
the same equilibrium as the status quo can be supported by what Tirole (1996) calls direct, rather
than delegated exclusion. More speci…cally, communication between I clients creates a potential role
for lawyer reputation. That is, the lawyer and the I clients can engage in a “reputational” contract
(a trigger-strategy equilibrium sustained by a mechanism of multilateral punishment). Formally, a
“reputational” contract (or equilibrium) ischaracterized by the variables (b a; b s) – whereb adenotes the
e¤ort level exerted by the lawyer and b s ¸0 denotes the (…xed) salary received by the lawyers along
the equilibrium path – and takes the following form:18
Each I client proposes an up-front contract pay = b s (denoted as contract cgood) if the lawyer
has a good reputation, while he o¤ers pay = 0 (denoted as contract cbad) if the lawyer has a bad
reputation. A lawyer with a good reputation selects b a if she has been o¤ered a contract cgood and
reverts to statically optimizing behaviour otherwise. A lawyer has a good reputation if she has never
dealt with I clients before or if she has exerted a = b a in all previous periods in which she has been
dealing with I clients and has been o¤ered a contract cgood. No requirement isimposed on thelawyer’s
behavior when o¤ered a contract other than cgood.
In the same manner as the “self-regulatory” equilibrium studied above, a reputational contract
needs to satisfy three constraints:
(I) Lawyer’s PC: the lawyer must be willing to engage in the reputational contract rather than
opting out of the market.
(II) Lawyer’s IC: given the equilibrium strategy followed by clients, the lawyer must not be
tempted to deviate (by putting in e¤ort level di¤erent from b a).
(III) Client’s PC: Given the equilibrium strategy followed by the lawyer, each client must …nd it
optimal to o¤er contract cgood.19
The characterization of the reputational contract mirrors that of the status quo equilibrium
derived above. As in that case, we concentrateon theequilibrium that maximizes client payo¤. This
is obtained by setting b a =–. Hence, just asin thestatus quo equilibrium, in thereputational contract
each client’s utility is 0:5–, while the lawyer’s payo¤ per period is 0:5–(1 ¡–). Notice however that,
17On the other hand, there may be special features of legal services which make construction of such mechanisms
more delicate. Speci…cally, advocacy services, by their nature typically produce one winner and one loser. Disgruntled
losers are likely to give negative feedback even when they actually received good representation. We are grateful to
Avinash Dixit for this remark.
18Here and in what follows, we restrict attention to stationary contracts; because the game we consider is one of
perfect information, this is without loss of generality (Abreu 1988).
19Note that it is always in the client’s interest to o¤er c
bad to a lawyer with a bad reputation.
9asalready mentioned, in contrast withthestatusquo case, herelawyerdisciplineisachieved by direct
exclusion, rather than by delegated exclusion. At this level of analysis, and under the assumption
that existing lawyers and entrants have the same discount factor and exclusion decisions are made
on the basis of the same information, there is no reason to suppose that both kinds of organisation
cannot coexist, implying that in the I market the existing market for lawyers need not be much
disturbed by the improvement of transparency. Importantly, under either form of organisation, the
suppliers of legal services require reputational rents to sustain non-opportunist behaviour.
C clients: We assume that a type C client is in…nitely lived. Each C client’s discount factor
(denoted as ‰) may di¤er from the lawyers’. In the formal analysis below, we assume ‰ is greater
than or equal to the lawyer’s discount factor –. This case might apply if C clients are large stable,
long-run organisations in comparison to the …rms supplying their legal services.20 The case where
C clients are less patient than lawyers is analysed in similar fashion and is omitted for reasons of
brevity, however theless patient casedoes lead to somewhat di¤erent conclusionswhich arepresented
in the statement of the resultS. Each C client requires legal support once per period. Hence, with
respect to the market for I clients (who require lawyer services only once), the market for C clients
possessestheadvantagethat thelawyerrepeatedly interactswith the sameclient. Thisintroducesthe
possibility of a trigger-strategy equilibrium whereby the lawyer is o¤ered an implicit-contract bonus
(what the literature calls a “relational” bonus) whenever she complies with the implicit agreement
(or “relational” contract) undertaken with the client. As we will see, this contributes to making
cooperation between lawyer and client more easily sustained than in the market for I clients.
A relational contract (or equilibrium) is characterized by the variables ( b A, b S; b B) – where b A
denotes the e¤ort level exerted by the lawyer, b S ¸0 denotes the base salary, and b B ¸ 0 denotes the
implicit-contract bonus along the equilibrium path – and takes the following form:
(i) if the lawyer has provided e¤ort level a = b A in all past interactions (or if the lawyer has never
previously interacted with theclient), theclient o¤ers her a contract with a base salary b S every time
he needs the lawyer’sservices. In addition, provided that the lawyeralso putsin a = b A in the present
interaction, the client pays her a relational bonus b B .
(ii) if the lawyer has failed to provide a= b A in any of the previous interactions, the client o¤ers
a contract with zero base salary, and zero relational bonus in every period.21
(iii) the lawyer puts in a = b A in every interaction so long as the client has o¤ered her a contract
with a base salary b S and has paid her the relational bonus b B in every previous period (or if the
lawyer and the client have never interacted before).
(iv) the lawyer puts in a =0 in every interaction otherwise.
A relational contract needs to satisfy the following four constraints:
(I) Lawyer’s PC: The lawyer must be willing to engage in the relational contract.
(II) Lawyer’s IC: Given the equilibrium strategy followed by clients, the lawyer must not be
20The notion that …rms/corporations may have longer horizons than individuals – and that indeed this may be a
rationale for their very existence – is for instance discussed in Cr· emer (1986).
21This implicitly rules out the possibility that a defecting lawyer could restart a “good”contractual relationship with
another C customer. As will become clear below, however, this is without loss of generality, as in equilibrium lawyers
earn no rents when interacting with C clients, and could therefore not earn a positive return by deviating and starting
afresh.
10tempted to deviate (by putting in e¤ort level di¤erent from b A).
(III) Client’s PC: Each client must …nd it optimal to enter the relational contract.
(IV) Client’s IC: The client must …nd it optimal to pay the bonus b B.
Notice that constraint (IV) was not present when discussing reputational contracts in the market
for I clients. The intuition is that, because clients of type I only interact with the lawyer once,
they have no incentive to pay the lawyer a discretionary bonus whenever she puts in the desired
e¤ort level. Hence, discretionary bonuses cannot possibly feature in a reputational equilibrium. In
contrast, here the lawyer interacts with the same C client all the time. In this case, therefore, fear
of future retaliation by the lawyer can act as an incentive for the client. In turn, this provides an
additional tool to sustain cooperation in the market.
It is easy to show that the lawyer’s (respectively, the client’s) participation constraint is always
weakly (strongly) satis…ed whenever her (his) incentive compatibility constraint is.22 Hence, we
only need to concern ourselves with incentive compatibility. The lawyer’s incentive compatibility
constraint requires 1
1¡–(b S + b B ¡0:5b A2) ¸ b S i.e.
b B ¸0:5b A2 ¡–b S (5)
Client’s IC: the client prefers to pay the bonus b B rather than deviate from the relational contract if
1
1¡‰( b A ¡ b S ¡ b B) ¸ b A ¡ b S i.e.
‰( b A ¡ b S) ¸ b B (6)
From (6) and (5) we see that the e¤ort levels that can be sustained in a reputational contract must
satisfy
‰ b A ¡0:5b A2 ¸ b S(‰ ¡–) (7)
For any given b S, and b A, the client’s payo¤ is maximized by having (5) hold with equality. In that
case, the client’s payo¤ is given by
b A ¡0:5b A2 +–b S ¡ b S (8)
The client selects b A and b S to maximize (8) subject to (7). It is straightforward to show that the
equilibrium contract has b S = 0 and b B =0:5b A2. The equilibrium e¤ort level satis…es
b A =
(
1 if ‰ ¸1=2
2‰ otherwise
(9)
Because ‰ ¸ –, it is easy to see that the e¤ort level (and the total surplus) that results in the
C market under policy II is always higher than that which results in the I market, and in the self-
regulatory equilibrium. Moreover, intherelational equilibrium, thelawyeriskept onto herreservation
utility (and therefore obtains less than in the I market equilibrium, where she earns positive rents).
Intuitively, thisis becausetherelational bonus softens thelawyer’sincentivecompatibility constraint.
Hence, in the C market the lawyer can be disciplined while earning no rents. Together, these two
results – namely that b A >b a and that lawyers earn no rents in the C market – imply that the utility
obtained by clients in the C market under transparency is strictly greater than that obtained in
22The lawyer’s and client’s participation constraints are given by b S+ b B ¡0:5 b A
2 ¸ 0 and b A¡ b S¡ b B ¸ 0 respectively.
11the I market, and is therefore also strictly greater than what clients obtain in the baseline “status
quo” scenario. This suggests that with transparency, in the C market we should expect the market-
based relational equilibrium to displacethe professional-based reputational equilibrium. In this case,
transparency allows a form of “market discipline” to emerge, that improves the clients’ position with
respect to the“statusquo”, self-regulatory scenario. It isimportant to notehowever, that for thecase
where C clientsare moreimpatient than lawyers(but not too impatient) clients can still rely on their
own reputations to supply incentivesin spot transactions, rather than rely on future rents to lawyers.
C clients therefore can recapture some of the rents and be better o¤ even when more impatient and
therefore worse at sustaining reputations than their lawyers. This comes at the expense of aggregate
surplus and the quality of legal services supplied. To summarise:
Result 3: In the I market, transparency can facilitate entry of alternative business structures
but the status quo payo¤s for clients and providers of legal services are unchanged absent positive or
negative information e¢ciency e¤ects.
In the C market, if the client is more patient than lawyers, transparency increases client welfare,
decreases lawyer welfare and increases aggregate social surplus. If the client is less patient than the
lawyer but not too impatient, then aggregate social welfare is reduced. If the C client is very impatient
the situation is identical to the I market.
3.3 Policy III: Accountability
As indicated in the introduction, one way to think about modelling regulation that raises or sets
standards is to interpret it as an increase in accountability and therefore an increase in what is
contractible when purchasing services. We follow this route in this section. In this context account-
ability is equivalent to introducing (partial) veri…ability of the lawyer’s action.23 This introduces the
possibility for clients to write explicit contracts where the lawyer’s compensation is contingent on
some veri…able measure of e¤ort. We suppose that partial veri…ability takes the form that a court
of law can costlessly verify whether a is above or below a certain threshold level a. As mentioned in
footnote 13, an alternative, super…cially more attractive way capturing the impact of increased ac-
countability would be to allow for lawyer actions to bemultidimensional and introducea contractible
linear measure of performance which is imperfectly aligned with the objectives of clients along the
lines of Dixit (2004). The results we obtain is the simple, one-dimensional case turn out very much
the same as in the multidimensional case. In both instances, what matters is how close the available
measure of performance is to the implemented policy (as measured by the projection of the policy
onto the linear set de…ned by the measure).
Wenaturally restrict attention to a <a¤ = 1 – where a¤ indicates the e¢cient (or…rst best) level
of e¤ort – and consider the e¤ect of veri…ability for each type of client in turn. First, we disengage
policy II and consider policy III in isolation. We then analyze the impact of implementing policy III
in conjunction with policy II.
23Here, and in what follows, we use the expression “partial veri…ability” and “enhanced accountability” interchange-
ably.
123.3.1 Accountability alone
Forthispolicy, thedistinction between C and Iclientsisimmaterial. When lawyer’sactionscannot be
directly observed by clients, raising accountability introduces thepossibility of achieving cooperation
by means ofan explicit contract (denoted as cE). Within this context, an explicit contract speci…es a
payment w o¤eredto thelawyer whenevera ¸a. Thelawyer will select a= awhenever w¡0:5a2 ¸0
i.e.
w ¸ 0:5a2: (10)
Given su¢cient competition, (10) holds with equality. Clients will be willing to engagein the explicit
contract (and pay w =0:5a2) if
a ¸0:5a2 (11)
which holds by the assumption a < a¤ = 1: When cE is used, the equilibrium payo¤ for the lawyer
is 0, while the payo¤ for each I client is a(1 ¡0:5a).
The possibility of utilizing an explicit contract a¤ects the client’s participation constraint when
dealing with “self-regulating” lawyers. In particular, clients may now resort to cE, instead of relying
on the self-regulating mechanism implemented by lawyers. Recall that each client’s payo¤ in the
status quo is 0:5–. This brings us to our fourth result:
Result4: In the absence transparency, if accountability is not tooweak (a >1¡
p
1 ¡–), improved
accountability increases the client’s utility compared with the status quo (from 0:5– to a(1 ¡0:5a))
and decreases the lawyer’s per period ex-post rents (from –(1¡0:5–) to 0): Otherwise it leaves client
and lawyer utility unchanged.
Aggregate surplus and legal service quality is unchanged for very low levels of accountability (a <
1 ¡
p
1 ¡–), is reduced for moderate levels of accountability (– > a > 1 ¡
p
1¡–) and is increased
for high levels of accountability (a >–).
Notethat increasing accountability herecan have a negative impact on social welfare through the
rent recapture e¤ect. Clients can motivate lawyers through explicit, but imperfect, contracts rather
than as previously rely on theprofessional standards supported in a delegated exclusion equilibrium.
For moderate quality of contracting, the professional standards will determine a more e¢cient stan-
dard of performance than the explicit contract, but what might be called the commoditisation and
reduction in quality of legal services allows clients to recapture lawyer rents. Lawyers are hurt by
commoditisation, but clients are not24, however we will identify circumstances below where clients
can be hurt.
3.3.2 Transparency and accountability together
We now characterize thee¤ect of introducing policy III in thepresence of information about lawyer’s
actions.
24Evidence to the 2006 Joint Committee on Draft Legal Services Bill by the Association of Personal Injury Lawyers:
“APIL further believes that the supplying of legal advice is conducted as a profession rather than simply an industry.
It would seem, however, that this distinction has been lost ... legal services, such as personal injury, will become
‘commoditised’. It is extremely debatable whether the claimant (client) would regard this as a welcome development.”
13I Clients: In the market for I clients, increased accountability introduces the possibility of
implementing a modi…cation ofthe reputational contract seen above. A reputational contract is now
characterized by (b a;b s; b w), where b w ¸ 0 denotes the explicit contract payment, paid whenever the
lawyer’s e¤ort is ¸a.
The explicit contract o¤ered along the equilibrium path, cgood, is now given by
pay =
(
b s+ b w if a ¸a
b s otherwise.
We concentrate on characterizing reputational contracts that implement b a ¸ a. This is because
any reputational contract implementing b a<aisnecessarily strictly dominatedby theexplicit contract
cE in which the lawyer earns no rents.
Notice that if an I client decides not to o¤er cgood, his best alternative is that of o¤ering cE.
Therefore, in equilibrium a lawyer with a bad reputation is o¤ered an explicit contract cE.
Asin Section 3.2, the reputational contract needsto satisfy three constraints, namely (I) Lawyer’s
PC, (II) Lawyer’s IC and (III) Client’s PC.
The lawyer’s PC constraint is always strictly satis…ed whenever her incentive compatibility
constraint is; hence, we only need to concentrate on the latter. Suppose that b w ¸ 0:5a2. In
this case, a lawyer who decides to cheat on the reputational contract can maximize her present
payo¤ by selecting a = a. The lawyer’s incentive compatibility constraint is therefore given by
1
1¡–(b s+ b w ¡0:5b a2) ¸ b s+ b w ¡0:5a2 i.e.
b s+ b w ¸
b a2 ¡a2 (1 ¡–)
2–
: (12)
Similarly, if b w · 0:5a2 the lawyer’s incentive compatibility constraint is












we see that the total lawyer compensation per period required to discipline the lawyer under raised
accountability is smaller than under non-veri…ability. This is is similar to the …ndings of Baker,
GibbonsandMurphy (1994), whoin amodel withasymmetricinformationand imperfect performance
measure show that formal and implicit contracts may under some circumstances complement each
other.
Client’s PC: In contrast with thecasein which e¤ort is entirely non-veri…able, now theclient’s PC
requires that each I client must prefer o¤ering cgood (that is, engage in the reputational contract) to
o¤ering cE (and only rely on an explicit contract). The client’s participation constraint is therefore
given by b a¡b s¡ b w ¸ a¡0:5a2 i.e.
b a¡a+0:5a2 ¸ b s+ b w: (15)
14Conditions (15) and (12) – respectively, (13) – are mutually consistent if
2–¡a ¸b a: (16)
As in the previous section, we concentrate on the equilibrium yielding the highest payo¤ to clients.
This is obtained by having b s+ b w =
b a2¡a2(1¡–)
2– , implying that the client’s payo¤ is:
b a¡
b a2 ¡a2 (1¡–)
2–
: (17)
The equilibrium e¤ort level maximizes (17) subject to (16) and is therefore given by:
b av =
(
– if a <–






2– if a < –
a¡0:5a2 if a ¸–:
(19)







(1¡–) if a <–
0 if a ¸–:
(20)
Recall that under the status quo we had b a = –, Uclient = 0:5– and Ulawyer = 0:5–(1 ¡–). It is
straightforward to show that:
Result 5: In the I market, in the presence of transparency, enhanced accountability strictly
increases client utility and (weakly) decreases lawyer rents. If a < –, client welfare is also higher
than under accountability alone. If a > –; aggregate social surplus (and quality of legal services) is
increased, while if a <– aggregate social surplus is the same as with transparency alone.25
C clients A relational contract is now de…ned by ( b A; b S; b B; c W), where c W ¸ 0 denotes the
explicit contract bonus paid whenever the lawyer’s e¤ort is ¸ a. As in the the previous subsection,
we only consider b A ¸ a.
As in Section 3.2, the reputational contract needs to satisfy four constraints, namely (I) Lawyer’s
PC, (II) Lawyer’s IC, (III) Client’s PC and (IV) Client’s IC.
We only need to concentrate on the lawyer and the client’s incentive compatibility constraints.
First, consider c W ¸ 0:5a2. In that case, the lawyer’s incentive compatibility constraint requires
b B ¸0:5b A2 ¡0:5a2 (1¡–)¡–
³
c W + b S
´
: (21)
25As for result 4, with respect to the status quo scenario aggregate social surplus is increased if a > –, reduced if
(– > a > 1 ¡
p
1 ¡–) and is unchanged if (a < 1 ¡
p
1 ¡–).
15Similarly, if c W · 0:5a2 the lawyer’s incentive compatibility constraint requires
b B ¸0:5b A2 ¡c W ¡–b S: (22)
It is straightforward to show that – as in section 3.2 – for a given b A the client’s payo¤ is maximized
by setting b S =0; c W+ b B = 0:5 b A2, implying that the lawyer earns no rents at equilibrium.
In thesamemannerasBaker, Gibbonsand Murphy (1994) and Dixit (2004), weassumethat ifthe
client cheats on therelational agreement, thelawyer would refuse to participatein any futureimplicit
contract but would be willing to consider explicit contracts and would accept an explicit contract if
it were su¢ciently attractive (i.e. giving her utility at least as high as her reservation utility, here
set at 0). The client’s incentivecompatibility constraint is thereforegiven by 1
1¡‰( b A¡b S¡ b B ¡c W) ¸







b A ¡ b S ¡c W ¡a+0:5a2
´
‰ ¸ b B (23)
Substituting for b S =0 and c W+ b B =0:5b A2 we see that conditions (21)/(22) and (23) are mutually
consistent if
2‰ ¡a ¸ b A (24)
In this case, the client’s payo¤ is
b A ¡0:5b A2 (25)





1 if 2‰ ¡1 ¸a
2‰ ¡a if ‰ ¸a ¸2‰ ¡1
a if a ¸‰
(26)
Comparing26 (26) with the equivalent requirement under (transparency and) full non-veri…ability:
b Anv =
(
1 if 2‰ ¡1 ¸0
2‰ otherwise
(27)
we see that the only situation in which raising accountability increases e¤ort is when b Av = a ,
b Anv = 2‰ and a > 2‰. Notice that because the client obtains the whole surplus generated by the
service, veri…ability increases the client’s welfare if and only if it increases b A. This brings us to the
following result:
Result 6: Suppose, ‰ ¸ –: In the the C market, in the presence of transparency, enhanced
accountability increases client utility and total surplus if and only if a >2‰, decreases them otherwise.
Lawyers’ rents are unchanged.27
To understand the result, it is instructive to compare the constraints placed upon what can
26It is straightforward to verify that with respect to the the status quo and the “accountability alone” scenarios
client’s welfare and social surplus are increased and lawyer’s welfare is decreased.
27If ‰ << –; and a << 2‰; client utility will still be reduced but if this makes governance by delegated monitoring
preferable to clients, it can increase aggregate surplus.
16be achieved by a reputational contract in this environment with those obtained when nothing is
veri…able. The lawyer’s incentive compatibility constraint is:
b B ¸ 0:5 b A2 ¡–b S when nothing is veri…able
b B ¸ 0:5 b A2 ¡–b S ¡0:5a2(1 ¡–) ¡–c W under partial veri…ability
So under partial veri…ability the lawyer’s incentive compatibility constraint is more easily satis…ed
than under full non-veri…ability. The client’s incentive compatibility constraint is:
b B · ‰( b A ¡ b S) when nothing is veri…able
b B · ‰
³




b A ¡ b S ¡a
´
under partial veri…ability
So under partial veri…ability the client’s incentive compatibility constraint is harder to satisfy than
under full non-veri…ability. In summary, increased accountability has two e¤ects: (i) the lawyer’s
IC constraint is easier to satisfy; and (ii) the client’s IC constraint is harder to satisfy. The …rst
e¤ect is analogous within the C market of the result discussed above for the I market, namely that
within our model, formal and informal contractual tools complement each other in disciplining the
lawyer. The second e¤ect is what we refer to as the relationship substitution e¤ect. This stems
from the fact that the possibility of writing formal contracts improves the client’s fallback position
in the event of a breakdown of the relational agreement. In turn, this makes it harder to discipline
the client, and therefore renders the relational contract harder to sustain. In our setting, the second
e¤ect always dominates in the C market.28 Intuitively, this is the case because in the C market the
client is already su¢ciently powerful to allow him to strip the lawyer of all rents, even in the case
where nothing is veri…able. Hence, in this market partial veri…ability only helps when a is binding.
Again, thisis similarto Baker, Gibbonsand Murphy (1994), Dixit (2004) and Schmidt and Schnitzler
(1995) although the result is here obtained in a somewhat di¤erent setting.
Results5and6show that thewelfareimpact ofimprovingaccountability will di¤eracrossmarkets.
In particular, while raising accountability increases the client’s utility in market I, client utility may
beadversely a¤ectedin theC market. Thus, withrespect to policiesdirectedat raisingaccountability,
a tension exists between protecting the interests of di¤erent types of users of legal services. More
generally, this result suggests that “one size …ts all” policies may more elusive than may appear at a
…rst glance. The impact of regulation may di¤er for di¤erent types of clients, implying that it may
be di¢cult for regulators to protect the interests of all clients simultaneously.
3.3.3 Summary
The following table gives an overview of the broad shape of the results. Various policies are listed
and the impact of the policy on clients, lawyers, and aggregate surplus/ quality of legal services is
entered in the body of thetable.29 Thee¤ect of the…rst threepolicy measures (namely De-licensing,
Certi…cation and Transparency) is measured against the status quo scenario, in which lawyers self-
28Notice that the second e¤ect is also present in the I market. There, however, this e¤ect has no bite, yielding the
result that raised accountability unambiguously increases client welfare.
29With " (respectively, #) indicating a positive (negative) impact, and = indicating no impact.
17regulate themselves. The e¤ect of Accountability is measured …rst against the status quo scenario
and then against a situation wheretransparency is present. For the C client market, the results refer
to the case where ‰ ¸–. The possible modi…cations that may emerge from the rent recapture e¤ect
when ‰ <– are in brackets.
Policy impact on clients, lawyers, aggregate surplus
C-client market I-client market
client lawyer surplus client lawyer surplus
De-licensing # # # # # #
Certi…cation = = = = = =
Transparency " # " (#) = = =
Accountability
– high level " # " " # "
– intermediate level " # # " # #
– low level = = = = = =
Accountability + Transparency
– high level " = " " # "
– low level # = # (") " # =
4 Interrelated markets
In this section we brie‡y consider what happens when both types of clients operate in a single
market. This introduces additional elements into the analysis because the lawyer’s outside payo¤
when operating in a given market may now be given by what she could obtain in a di¤erent market.
Ifskills aretransferable, in orderto attract lawyers, C clients will now haveto match the rents o¤ered
by I clients. There aremany permutations of possible scenarios and we do not attempt an exhaustive
discussion. However, there are policy implications.
For example: First, let us modify our conception of a C client so that (realistically) such clients
are now assumed to accrue the ‘transparency’ information through their own experience rather than
through policy intervention. Second, suppose that professional regulation (delegated exclusion) is
expensive so the rents of lawyers are dissipated in professional fees. Assuming uniform training and
feesfor lawyers regardlessofclient type, C clientswill haveto pay theex-post rentsto attract lawyers
even though they can manage their own incentives as per section 3.2. Since they have to pay in any
case, they arelikely to bebettero¤relying onprofessional governancerather thantheir own relational
governance. Clearly, this creates scope in the market for entry into the C market by lawyers with
a leaner professional governance structure. Since lawyer rents were previously dissipated, this is a
social improvement and speaks in favour of the proposed reforms.
Alternatively, consider policies that enhance accountability and assume lawyer rents are not
dissipated. As seen in section 3.3, in the I market these policies will lower the rents obtained by
lawyers. This introduces an indirect bene…t of such policies also for C clients, which was not present
when considering separate markets. In that case, therefore, theinter-relation between themarkets for
C and I clients softens the con‡ict of interests between di¤erent types of clients, that was identi…ed
18when discussing separate markets. One can show that the con‡ict is still present, but we omit the
details30.
5 Concluding Remarks
A central concern of the paper is to analyse the possible impact of legal services reform on clients,
lawyers and the quality of legal services provided. We have emphasised that the governance of legal
services is multi-faceted and that not only explicit contracts enforced by law, but also implicit ones
supported by the reputations of lawyers and sometimes their clients all play a role in the degree of
e¢ciency achieved.
Weconsider a series ofstylised reforms, the…rst concern the introduction oflegal servicesuppliers
that arenot subject to e¤ectiveprofessional selfregulationandwhen clientsareinsu¢ciently informed
for market disciplines to work e¤ectively. We argued that policy would at best maintain the status
quo (in the case that existing lawyers can certify thedistinction between themselves and the putative
newcomers) and at worst (in the case in which the newcomers cannot be distinguished from existing
lawyers) it would cause the market to collapse. This collapse is a consequence of the complete
ignorance of consumers and therefore draws attention to the need to attend to making sure clients
are adequately informed. We show that implementing this has many e¤ects.
The second aspect of reform we consider is enhanced transparency and we show that its impact
variesfordi¤erent types ofclients. Enhanced transparency increasestheutility oflong-livedcorporate
clients who are able to use the information to leverage their own reputations and thereby partially
resolve the governance problem in a relational contract. In such a contract, the rents accruing to
lawyers is reduced compared to the status quo and the impact on the quality of legal services and
aggregate surplus depends on whether the clients or the lawyers are better at carrying the requisite
reputations(thisdependson theirrelativediscount factors). Thequality oflegal services, forexample,
su¤erswhenclientssubstitute a less e¢cient governancearrangement for a more e¢cient onein order
to recapture rents that otherwise accrue to lawyers.
We then consider enhanced accountability. We show that, absent transparency, an increase
in accountability will increase clients’ welfare whenever the minimum level of e¤ort that can be
guaranteed by explicit contracts is not too low, however if it is su¢ciently far from the …rst best, the
quality of legal services can again su¤er via the rent recapture e¤ect. If accountability is increased
in conjunction with transparency then the impact of the policy varies dramatically between markets.
In the I market, increased accountability unambiguously increases clients’ welfare, and decreases the
lawyers’ utility. In contrast, in the C market, increased accountability increases client welfare only
when the minimum level of e¤ort that can be guaranteed by explicit contracts is su¢ciently high,
and decreases it otherwise. This perverse e¤ect arises because the cost of a breakdown of relational
governance is reduced by the enhanced contracting options, the relationship substitution e¤ect.
Somegeneral lessons emerge: Policiesmay haveoppositee¤ects indi¤erent markets. Forexample,
with respect to raising accountability, a potential tension exists between protecting the interests of
di¤erent types of users of legal services. Therefore, in drawing up the details of reform, it may be
appropriateto design the details di¤erently for di¤erent sectors. Speci…cally, regulation might attend
30Available on request.
19more to the rights of individual clients in e.g. family law cases than to large corporations who not
only can look after themselves but may be better o¤ if allowed to do so.
Second, the modelling approach although simple does allow a con‡ict for some policies between
the welfare of clients and the quality of legal services provided. To the extent that the latter is an
objective in itself there is a tension between the two which the paper makes more precise. In the
model, lawyer rents typically increase with the quality of legal services so a re‡ection of this con‡ict
in objectives should be expected in the debate over reform. This feature of the debate is easy to
document but hard to pin down, and this paper supplies one way to view it. This view leads to
a positive prediction that the professional agencies (even if only acting in the ex-ante interests of
their members) should resist some reforms and should welcome or even instigate some others. For
example, regulating services in a manner that provides greater transparency may be a good strategy
fora professional association to adopt ifdelegatedmonitoringandexclusioniscostly andtransparency
enables reputational monitoring of the market to govern its behaviour more cost e¤ectively. Such
policies should naturally be part of a reputational self-governance strategy of an association. Our
modelling approach predicts that this is more likely in I markets than C markets. It may be easier
for di¤erent front-line regulators to deal with the separate markets rather than have a single agency.
Free entry of front-line regulators is part of the reform package currently under discussion.
Third, the e¤ect of policies is rife with nonmonotonicities. Tokenism can be worse than irrel-
evant, it can harm clients and the quality of legal services. For example this happens in result 6,
where accountability is good only if provided in adequate quantity. This weighs against “light touch
regulation” in certain markets.
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